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Abstract 
Hammersley (200*) criticises a particular style of discourse research for developing 
as a distinct paradigm, yet lacking the coherence a paradigm would require.  He 
suggests a range of problems in relation to constructionism, reflexivity, and the ‘thin’ 
model of the human actor, and argues instead for methodological eclecticism where 
discourse analytic methods are supplementary to alternatives.  This commentary 
highlights a range of confusions and misunderstandings in this critique.  In 
particular, it highlights the way discourse analytic work is connected to a range of 
theoretical notions, most fundamentally in its theorising of discourse itself as a 
medium oriented to action.  It identifies important sources of incoherence that can 
arise when mixing discourse analytic and more traditional methods.  It reiterates the 
virtues of constructionism, particularly when considering the operation of 
descriptions, stresses the value of exploring (rather than ignoring) reflexive issues, 
and emphasises the rich and nuanced approach to psychology that has been 
developed in this tradition. 
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Martyn Hammersley (200*) has provided a detailed critical commentary on 
some aspects of some approaches to discourse analysis (DA) and conversation 
analysis (CA).  The points are wide-ranging and there is space to deal properly with 
only some of them.  I will attempt to correct the major confusions and offer 
arguments against his broader claims.  I hope that my argumentative approach will 
be taken as collegial one, argument being a fine thing in the DA universe! 
The central point of Hammersley’s paper (hence MHP) is that DA and CA 
have been developed as distinct paradigms, yet they lack the coherence needed for 
this because of a range of conceptual and philosophical reasons, and because of a 
resistance to taking the (seemingly) sensible course of attributing distinctive qualities 
to categories of actors and using what people say as a source of information.  DA and 
CA should instead be treated as useful but limited methods, which can be effectively 
used in conjunction with other methods.    
Let me make some broad observations about the argument before addressing 
some of the specific points.  Note that I am not proposing to speak for DA as a whole, 
let alone CA (although some of my points will have a wider focus). 
1. Paradigms, methods and the discursive terrain 
The category discourse analysis is both a boon and an encumbrance.  It is a 
boon as an enclosure in which a range of different kinds of work can come up against 
one another (as the current discussion illustrates).  The success of the journal 
Discourse and Society is a testament to how creative that contact can be and how 
vibrant the debates have been.  However, it is an encumbrance when treated as a 
singular thing without appreciating the consequences of its diversity (which is easily 
seen in the range of current overviews available: e.g. Jaworski & Coupland, 1999; 
Phillips & Jorgenson, 2002, Schiffrin, 1994; van Dijk, 1997; Wetherell, et al., 2001; 
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Wood & Kroger, 2000).  For clarity, and to avoid trying to speak for the DA and CA 
community as a whole, I will develop my response to Hammersley from the 
particular variant of DA known as discursive psychology (henceforth DP; see 
Edwards & Potter, 1992, 2001; Potter & Edwards, 2001).  Nevertheless, a number of 
the points will have a broader relevance. 
MHP’s arguments about paradigms may seem sensible when viewed from a 
distance, yet they fail to stand up to closer inspection.  Let us first note that the 
notion of a paradigm is a tricky one.  In Kuhn’s original vision its role was to 
highlight the coordination of very different elements in scientists’ conceptual worlds 
– values for theory choice, metaphysical models, symbolic generalizations and 
exemplars.  According to Kuhn these are ‘the objects of group commitment… and as 
such they form a whole and function together’ (1970, p. 182).  Yet there is much 
confusion as to how strong this ‘functioning together’ had to be and, famously, Kuhn 
specifically excluded social sciences from his analysis, doubting that they could ever 
be paradigmatic.   
It is, therefore, confusing to talk of DP as a paradigm.  Indeed, to do so risks 
stifling or evading debate with other approaches.  One of the features in the 
development of DP (and much of DA) has been engagement at a theoretical, 
methodological and conceptual level with, for example, mainstream psychology and 
its approach to (and construction of) basic topics such as attribution, attitudes and 
social representations.  This empirical and rhetorical engagement has been 
fundamental to DP’s development; nevertheless it is precisely the kind of thing that 
the well-known incommensurability of paradigms was supposed to rule out.  
It is equally misleading to talk of DP as a method.  It is not a free-standing set 
of data generating and data analytic procedures.  It is an approach embedded in a 
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web of theoretical and metatheoretical assumptions.  Theoretical advances in 
conceptualising language were an important motor in its development.  Constructing 
the research topic as discourse marks a move from considering language as an 
abstract system of terms to considering talk and texts as parts of social practices. It is 
not by chance that this journal is called Discourse & Society not Language & Society.  
Much of what is distinctive about DA/DP is a result of following through this move 
rigorously and, relevantly for this context, following it through in the arena of 
method.   
Theorizing language in this way means that the choice of discourse analysis is 
not like selecting one dessert from an array of different and equally tasty ones, or 
having two scoops of ice cream and one slice of chocolate cake.  Rather discourse 
analytic methods have been developed (and still develop) to encompass and address 
this active use of language.  Mixing them with methods that presuppose a very 
different view of discourse is a recipe for incoherence. 
On the one hand, this involves a positive recognition of the primacy of 
discourse as a medium for action.  It ceases to be sensible to separate a study of 
language from a study of behaviour as traditional social psychologists might.  Many 
researchers (not just discursive psychologists, but people in different traditions 
represented in Discourse & Society) are involved in discourse analytic work because 
it involves studying one of the most pervasive, important and interesting things 
about human life.    
On the other, hand this recognition of discourse as action oriented has been 
the foundation of a series of critiques of alternative methods.  Typically, these 
critiques have shown how a particular set of claims are a product of embedding 
discourse in a method without considering the pragmatics of that discourse.  Note 
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that the critiques go beyond the basic claim that language is active and so methods 
that fail to recognise this are flawed.  Rather they attempt to demonstrate in specific 
detail how particular claims in particular studies are flawed.  For example, 
discursive psychological work on what used to be called attitudes has highlighted a 
range of pragmatic peculiarities and assumptions in the way attitude scales are 
designed and interpreted (Potter, 1998a; Puchta & Potter, 2002).   
To take a simple instance, Wiggins & Potter (in press) considered attitude 
measures in the area of food and eating.  They highlight the way those measures (a) 
predetermine the descriptive categories available to participants; (b) effectively strip 
off any practical business that people might be doing in using food evaluation; (c) 
recast conglomerated statistical findings in terms of an underlying universe of tastes, 
flavours and psychological states that are, in turn, further abstracted as ‘preferences’ 
and ‘attitudes’.  Wiggins & Potter went on study naturalistic records of food talk to 
show how particular distinctions (e.g. between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ 
assessments of food – ‘I loved that pizza’/’that pizza is lovely’) can be highly 
consequential and yet are blurred together in standard measures of food attitudes.  
How should we respond to arguments and research findings of this kind?  
They raise very deep problems for MHP’s argument for DA as a supplementing 
method (nothing less, nothing more). Should we supplement an attitude scale with a 
naturalistic study of eating?  Given the problems identified this seems to be a 
particularly incoherent thing to do.  Of course, such research could be used to try and 
improve attitude scales.  However, there is not much sign of attitude researchers 
responding in this way, probably because there is no easy technical solution to the 
problems raised.   
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There is a broader tension here between the different meta-theoretical 
assumptions of traditional attitude work and discursive psychology.  The former 
typically uses a factors-and-outcomes logic that has been developed alongside 
notions of experimental manipulation and the associated multivariate statistics.  This 
goes along with questions of the kind: what is the influence of X on Y (of health 
beliefs on diet, of family breakdown on education failure, and so on).  DA/DP work 
does not, typically, ask questions of this form.  Often they are more like: what is an 
X?  How is X done?  How is X managed in the context of Y?  The logic of these 
questions is conversational and rhetorical; they emphasise action and construction.  
They do not mix easily with questions involving factors and outcomes. 
  This is not a surprising or a particularly novel claim.  Methods or analytic 
approaches do not tend to be freestanding – they are typically associated with 
broader principles and assumptions.  It is only when such associations become 
embedded into research procedures over a long period of time that they become 
invisible.  One of the positive contributions of an alternative analytic approach such 
as DA/DP is that it can highlight things that have become implicit and taken-for-
granted.  The practical corollary of this is the confusion that researchers’ risk when 
trying to join together methods such as these without appreciating the tensions 
between them.  I see this personally when refereeing articles and, frequently but 
more poignantly, in pleas for help from researchers who have tried to mix methods in 
the way advocated in MHP and have become, understandably, deeply confused. 
Maybe Hammersley would see the methods of traditional social psychology as 
a rather soft target, as the kind of positivism that is often treated as discredited in 
broader traditions of social science.  Yet the basic observations are not dissimilar 
from Sacks’ critique of traditional ethnography (Sacks, 1992).  A major element in 
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that critique is derived from Sacks’ general theorizing of the nature of description, 
and his specific observations about membership categories (cf. Silverman, 1998).  
Put simply, the argument is that ethnographic field notes already embody major 
elements of judgement and analysis in the formulating and categorising that they 
inevitably involve, and that these are very hard to then make explicit, and harder still 
for readers to recover from ethnographic writing.  Again a more sophisticated 
understanding of language raises questions of research methods that have 
traditionally assumed something simpler.  Of course, in ethnography these kinds of 
problems have led to a range of developments and modifications, from the more 
reflexive tradition focused on ethnographic texts and their operation (see e.g. 
Atkinson, 1990), on the one hand, to the convergence of ethnographic methods with 
ethnomethodological CA in the work of Goodwin, Heath and others (e.g. Goodwin, 
1997; Luff & Heath, 2002), on the other.  Instead of supplementing ethnography, this 
work (along with other complementary ideas) has been the basis for a thoroughgoing 
reappraisal of ethnographic methods.  
The general point, then, is that DA/DP is neither a self contained paradigm 
nor a stand-alone method that can be easily mix-and-matched with others.  It is an 
approach with a range of meta-theoretical, theoretical, and methodological elements.  
It does not tell us all we need to know about social life – nor is it intended to.  
However, it developed as an approach for a range of theoretical and methodological 
reasons that are not arbitrary.  Combining it with methods that make different 
assumptions about discourse – grounded theory, content analysis, social surveys, etc. 
– is likely to lead to incoherence.  Of course, DA/DP can be used on data generated 
through procedures such as open-ended interviews or focus groups, and it shades 
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into ethnography when drawing on combinations of video/audio records and 
documents – but that is not the same thing.   
This suggests that methodological eclecticism is unlikely to be a pathway to 
progress.  On the contrary it can generate muddle.  Clarity and innovation is at least 
as likely to be a consequence of single methods being drawn on with a clear rationale 
and appropriately formulated research questions.  This can be combined with 
rigorous arguments between approaches over matters of theory, data, philosophy 
and so on.  Ironically, this is rather similar to what was suggested by Kuhn as the 
path to progress in his 1962 book. 
2. Conceptions of construction, reality and reflexivity 
An important part of MHP is devoted to identifying supposed conceptual 
confusions in DA, and in particular in its constructionism.  Constructionism is 
certainly a source of confusion and controversy, and has been one area of 
disagreement between CA and some styles of DA (for summary see Hepburn & 
Potter, in press).  Indeed, there are probably as many different varieties of 
constructionism as there are varieties of DA.  However, the relevant variety here is 
the one addressed by MHP, and the characterisation is wrong.   
MHP comes at constructionism from a philosophical angle and renders it a 
kind of idealism.  For example: ‘the constructed character of social phenomena is 
taken to indicate that those phenomena do not have the kind of objective reality 
normally ascribed to them by everyday social actors and by most social scientists’ 
(MHP, ms. p. 7).  The constructionism in DP is certainly not an attempt to deny the 
‘objective reality’ of phenomena, which would be as realist a move as endorsing that 
reality (Edwards, et al., 1995; Potter, 1998b).  Rather it is considering the role of 
those phenomena in terms of peoples’ descriptions, glosses, categories, orientations 
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and so on.  In doing this it picks up from a rigorous tradition of studying knowledge 
developed by sociologists of science.  Workers within that tradition have found that a 
form of methodological relativism is indispensable for managing a range of tensions 
and troubles (see Potter, 1996).    
The significance of this issue goes beyond researchers specifically interested in 
knowledge.  Take an example from ethnomethodological CA.  Paul Drew studied the 
operation of examination of witnesses in a rape trial he identified and explicated the 
development of accusations and defences.  This did not require a unique (and 
godlike) access to the reality of events beyond the court case.   
C: An’ during that eve:ning: (0.6) uh: didn't  
 Mistuh ((name)) [the defendant] come over  
 tuh sit with you 
 (0.8) 
W: Sat at our table. 
   (Drew, 1992, p. 489) 
The competing (but not contradictory) versions produced by the Counsel and the 
Witness are the basis for different kinds of activities (roughly blame increasing and 
blame denying).  While ‘sit with you’ suggests familiarity and prior relationship, ‘sat 
at our table’ de-personalizes and de-familiarizes the relationship. 
In methodological terms, the discourse can be analysed for how it is put 
together to perform activities without knowing about the reality of W and Mistuh 
((name’s)) motives, or about the solidity of the table they sat at (or near).  Those 
things are the job of the jury to assess; the discourse analyst’s job is of a different 
order.  That is not to say that the two things are not potentially related.  As the sexual 
violence comes into the courtroom in terms of descriptions, items of evidence, 
images and so on then its constitution as a crime or not is studiable.  Matoesian 
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(1993, 2001) illustrates one way in which such an analysis might unfold.  Wowk 
(1984) shows another possibility.  Wood and Rennie (1994) shows yet another.  Some 
conversation analysts have suggested that interaction patterns might be linked to 
outcomes in a broader fashion (see Heritage, in press, on the relation of doctors’ 
prescriptions of antibiotics to interaction in the examination).  Put simply, an 
interest in discourse is both coherent and consequential, opening up a number of 
different analytic options, some more descriptive, some critical (Hepburn, 2003).   
One way of understanding this is to see that DP (and similar forms of DA) are 
taking a radically emic view of objects (whether they be motives, gravity waves, social 
classes or whatever).  That is, those things are understood in relation to their 
involvement in participants’ practices.  For example, when Charles Goodwin (1997) 
studied the colour category ‘jet black’ (often treated as a cognitive universal) in the 
practices of scientists he was able to show the way membership of the category was 
accomplished in a variety of ways:  
for the geochemists, jet black (i.e. the most prototypical example of black) was 
not a context-free universal color category that pointed automatically to a 
specific set of color shades; instead, the term constituted a point of departure 
for a problematic judgment to be artfully accomplished through the 
deployment of a collection of systematic work practices (Goodwin, 1997, p. 
132-3). 
Now note MHP’s claim that ethnomethodology and constructionism 
both effectively deny what seems to be a near universal feature of human 
experience, and one which has been the driving concern behind much 
conventional social science: that we are part of a causal nexus of physical and 
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social events which shapes how we think and act, and what we are able to 
accomplish (MHP, ms. p. 20). 
MHP fails to understand research practice in this area.  It is not that Goodwin’s 
study, to take one instance, is effectively denying the claim that ‘the causal nexus of 
physical events’ (say the blackness of black) shapes how we think; nor is he endorsing 
it.  Rather he is taking seriously what black is in this practice where black is highly 
relevant.  MHP’s plea for some kind of common sense – ‘come on Charles, we know 
what black is’? – would simply obscure the relevant discourse practices. 
Another way of understanding what is wrong with MHP with respect to this 
claim is that it is simply not justified.  Where does the idea that ‘we are part of a 
causal nexus’ is ‘a near universal feature of human experience’ come from?  It is a 
tendentious claim whose vagueness gives it a surface plausibility.  Nevertheless, 
without being diverted by the extraordinary variety of cosmologies identified in 
classic anthropological work, we can note that close studies of particular practices in 
particular settings are often difficult to square with the idea that people are working 
with one simple coherent picture.  For example, in Latour and Woolgar’s (1986) 
study of the construction of scientific facts they note that at various points the 
scientists talked as realists, as conventionalists, as sceptics or even as relativists.  
Attributing an overarching, unitary common sense theory would have done violence 
to the practical and finessed way their scientific lives were organized. 
MHP blurs together the style of DA discussed here with some kinds of critical 
discourse analysis that attempt to explain social actions in terms of social interests.  
The suggestion is that some DA takes a view of social life ‘in which individuals and 
groups employ discursive strategies in pursuit of various interests’ (MHP, ms. p. 7).  
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Some discourse work may take this view, however DP is explicit in rejection of this 
approach.  It is worth quoting at length to show how mistaken MHP is: 
It is important to emphasise what I am not claiming here.  The argument is 
not that social researchers should interpret people’s discourse in terms of their 
individual or group interests.  There are all sorts of difficulties with such an 
analytic programme, not least of which is that it is very difficult to identify 
interests in a way that is separable from the sorts of occasioned interest 
attribution that participants use when in debate with one another...  The 
argument here is that people treat each other in this way.  They treat reports 
and descriptions as if they come from groups and individuals with interests, 
desires, ambitions and stake in some versions of what the world is like.  
Interests are a participants’ concern, and that is how they can enter analysis 
(Potter, 1996, p. 110). 
The difference between using interests to explain actions and treating interest 
attribution as a topic of study is a crucial one.  Again, this clearly highlights what 
makes the approach discourse analytic rather than a more conventional social 
science of groups, actors and interests.  Moreover, HMP’s general glosses on 
Wetherell & Potter (1992) are equally wide of the mark when they characterise it as 
dependent on a realist history of the development of New Zealand society, or on the 
correct identification of particular social groupings.  Although versions of these 
things are important for understanding the significance of the analyses, and how they 
might be related to particular claims and conflicts, they are not a prerequisite for 
many of the analytic claims in that book.  For example, Wetherell & Potter’s 
observations about the way descriptions of culture can be used in both constructing 
and criticising particular social groups, while avoiding the negative associations of 
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traditional racist discourse, does not depend on a particular story of history or social 
organization. 
MHP highlights a range of what it formulates as reflexive problems in DA.  
The argument seems to be that DA is both insufficiently reflexive about its own 
descriptive practices and so reflexive that it blurs the distinction between research 
and writing fiction (MHP, ms. 14).  DA researchers have taken reflexive issues 
seriously (most seriously in Ashmore, 1989) in considering the consequences of their 
analysis of fact construction for their own texts.  These consequences have been 
explored in part through literary experimentation; but such experimentation is by no 
means a prerequisite for DA work.  Nevertheless, they are generic issues that have 
been taken more seriously in DA than in the (rather under specified) conventional 
social science approaches that MHP advocates.  Surely the widespread failure to 
consider reflexive issues in other analytic approaches is more of a worry for them 
than DA’s consideration, however far from an ideal it is.   
The suggestion that DA is, through its consideration of reflexive issues, 
moving toward aesthetic rather than epistemic criteria is wrong.  Any reading of 
methods writing in DA and DP over the past 15 years will note a range of criteria 
specifically offered for good work, as well as considerations of issues of validity, 
reliability and discussions of sampling (contra MHP’s claim on ms. p. 18); yet none of 
these criteria are specifically aesthetic (for recent examples, see Potter, 2003, in 
press).  Indeed, MHP does not pay much attention to the empirical work in this field 
where such criteria are in play – the most recent actual research study in DA he 
discusses is Wetherell & Potter (1992) that is more than ten years old – not 
surprisingly, there has been considerable theoretical and methodological progress in 
the intervening years.  MHP’s points are abstract rather than grounded in cases. 
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MHP also develops the claim that DA has a rather thin model of the actor 
(specifically thinner than its thin, but perhaps inconsistently thick, model of society – 
MHP ms. p. 12).  On the one hand, a certain kind of thinness is what is required.  The 
thicker DA’s model of the actor, the more it would obscure the models used in 
peoples’ practices.  DA is itself dependent on neither a developed notion of society 
nor of human beings (nor physics, furniture, G3 mobile phone technology and so on).  
Its focus is on discourse, and these other things enter into it in terms of descriptions, 
orientations, and formulations.  Yet, on the other hand, MHP’s observation seems to 
involve a highly traditional approach on these things, where society and its actors are 
understood as structured sets of causal entities. 
Let us take psychology and focus again on DP.  Although DP is not developing 
a model of what a person is in the classic psychological mode, it nevertheless offers 
an approach to the most intimate, subtle and complex of psychological phenomena.  
Edwards’ (1997) book on discourse and cognition, for example, includes work on the 
way constructions of particular emotional states in relationship counselling are 
bound up with certain kinds of attributions of blame, which are further bound up 
with counselling practices and practical upshots such as who needs to change.  Billig 
(1999) offers a different but complementary take on psychology in his rhetorical 
reworking of Freudian repression.  It is a rather weak idea of what is thick or thin 
that treats these intimate, consequential studies of psychology in practice as 
somehow lacking in comparison to traditional models of agents with inner motors.   
By not starting with a predefined model of the human actor DP allows a 
broader and more culturally embedded set of possible constructions and relevancies 
to be identified.  Moreover, this approach does not contradict the inner motor view.  
In taking psychology in terms of its constructions and orientations it does not 
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straightforwardly contradict behavioural, cognitive, humanistic, psychodynamic or 
neuropsychological views.   
There is contradiction, however, but it is much more nuanced than MHP 
implies.  It is a consequence of DA studies of the way discourse is conceptualised in 
the methods of human research.  Particular models of the person may be dependent 
on certain assumptions wired into method.  Edwards & Potter (1992) develop this 
argument in detail with respect to a range of methods in social and cognitive 
psychology.  Other relevant studies of method include Schegloff’s (1999) study of the 
administration of a test for ‘pragmatic deficit’ and Antaki’s (1999) analysis of the 
delivery of tests for assessing peoples’ ‘quality of life’.  The point is that critique of 
psychology comes less from developing an alternative model of the actor, as would be 
the traditional psychological way, than through developing an alternative 
understanding of language and its role in the machineries of psychological research 
and assessment. 
3.  Discourse and Society (and Psychology) 
In MHP’s characterisation DA has a highly restricted topic of study.  It studies 
discourse leaving psychology, society, social processes etc. to other approaches.  This 
characterisation goes with the call for complementary methods.  However, the power 
and broad relevance of DA comes from the centrality of discourse.  Discourse is the 
vital medium for action.  It is the medium through which versions of the world are 
constructed and produced as pressing or ignorable.  For social scientists the study of 
discourse becomes a powerful way of studying mind, social processes, organizations, 
events, as they are live in human affairs. 
On of the features of MHP is its conceptual approach to DA.  It is attempting 
to identify coherence from a perspective that is itself untroubled by the messy 
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business of doing research (apart from vague allusions to sensible, traditional 
approaches).  It does not, therefore, have to compare DA to other specific kinds of 
research.  However, one of the features of the development of DA and DP has been a 
rigorous cross comparison with other kinds of studies (from a range of traditions).  
The key point of these comparisons here is that they highlight the way that other 
kinds of research are also centrally dependent on discourse of various kinds (in 
experimental protocols, interviews, vignettes, ethnographic descriptions) while 
failing to recognise the importance of this centrality.  The business being done in the 
answer to a question in an ethnographic interview is not theorized as such; the 
constructive work of an experimental vignette is overlooked.  We are not in a 
situation where there is discourse analysis and non-discourse analysis.  Rather there 
is analysis that is highlighting and attending to the role of that discourse and analysis 
which is ignoring it.  It is this final point that makes MHP’s call for a traditional mix 
of methods ill judged.    
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